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Abstract
In this paper, we match data on student performance in a multiple-choice exam with
data on student risk preferences that are extracted from a classroom experiment. We find
that more-loss-averse students leave more questions unanswered and perform worse in the
multiple-choice exam when giving an incorrect answer is penalized compared to not an-
swering. We provide evidence that loss aversion parameters extracted from lottery choices
in a controlled experiment have predictive power in a field environment of decision mak-
ing under uncertainty. Furthermore, the degree of loss aversion appears to be persistent
over time, as the experiment was conducted three months prior to the exam. We also
find important di↵erences across genders; they are partly explained by di↵erences in loss
aversion.
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I Introduction
In multiple-choice exams, students have to make risky choices among the possible answer
options. With rewards for not answering questions (compared to giving the wrong answer),
students have to decide for each question whether or not to answer. To do so, they have to
assess how likely they are to pick the correct answer. As we show in this paper, loss aversion
enters as an important explanatory factor to make such gambles.
Our field data consist of multiple-choice scores from an introductory economics exam,
which is typically taken in the first semester of studies: each student was asked to answer 30
multiple-choice questions and received a score in which correctly answered and unanswered
questions entered positively. Wematch themwith data on students’ ability and behavioral char-
acteristics including students’ loss aversion and risk aversion parameters, which we extracted
from an incentivized classroom experiment on lottery choices.1 We regress our performance
measures from the field on students’ characteristics. Our main result is that more-loss-averse
students are less likely to answer a question. While loss aversion partly explains behavior, the
risk aversion parameter inferred from our classroom experiment does not.
Since the classroom experiment was conducted around three months prior to the multiple
choice exam, the loss aversion parameter elicited through our experiment appears to be persis-
tent. In addition, loss aversion present in a low-stake environment explains performance in a
di↵erent, high-stake environment. In our data set, loss aversion hurts students as they take too
few gambles. If the goal of the multiple-choice test is to evaluate the knowledge and ability
of the student, behavioral parameters such as risk aversion, loss aversion, and self-confidence
should not a↵ect the score. From this perspective, our results inform the designer of multiple-
choice exams of unintended consequences when introducing punishment for wrong answers
(i.e. through deductions for wrong answers or, as in the exam we investigate, rewards for not
answering a question). The argument in favor of punishment for wrong answers is that it
increases the precision, as students who do not assign a high probability to any answer of a
particular question decide not to answer this question. As we show, the designer faces a trade-
o↵ between precision and bias: Punishment increases precision at the cost of introducing a
bias by punishing loss-averse students.
1Our elicitation method of individual loss aversion builds on Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2005), Fehr and Go¨tte
(2007), and Ga¨chter, Johnson, and Herrmann (2007); it is based on Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) cumulative
prospect theory and Rabin (2000)’s calibration theorem.
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In line with the extant literature on gender e↵ects, we also document gender di↵erences
in answering questions in multiple-choice exams. Women are less likely to answer a given
question conditional on estimated ability and other individual characteristics. This gender gap
is partly explained by gender di↵erences in the inferred loss-aversion parameters.
To guide our empirical investigation, we provide a simple theory and derive the testable
prediction that a higher degree of loss aversion reduces the inclination to gamble. The idea
here is that higher expected utility losses due to a larger degree of loss aversion reduce the
inclination to accept a gamble. We note that a theory based on risk aversion rather than loss
aversion could also provide the prediction of a lower inclination to gamble. However, this
is not borne out by our data. The payo↵s from gambling in the exam have a mixed support
(i.e. are positive or negative if we make the plausible assumption that the payo↵ from not
answering a question serves as reference point). This resembles the monetary lottery that we
use in the classroom experiment to elicit individual degrees of loss aversion and suggests that
loss aversion could play out in a similar way in both environments.
We combine lab and field data to obtain a unique data set of more than 650 students that
includes students’ lottery choices, other characteristics of students, and data on their behav-
ior and performance in an exam. At the beginning of the term students of an introductory
economics course participated in a classroom experiment consisting of a crude ability test (a
cognitive reflection test) and an incentivized problem of lottery choice. Furthermore, we col-
lected information on student characteristics (gender, main field of study, age, self-assessment
of confidence). Then, at the end of the term, students took the exam of the introductory eco-
nomics class. This gives us students’ responses to 30 multiple-choice questions.
Our result that more-loss-averse students are less inclined to gamble is robust across a num-
ber of empirical specifications. Furthermore, lower response rates a↵ect performance. In our
data set, more-loss-averse students perform worse. A causal channel how loss aversion a↵ects
performance is that more-loss-averse students are less inclined to gamble when faced with the
choice to select between multiple choices with implicit punishment for wrong answers.
In our regressions, we condition results on the level of ability measured by a cognitive
reflection test (CRT, Frederick, 2005). This is an imperfect measure of ability and the only
direct measure available to us. Therefore, an important concern is that loss aversion may be
negatively correlated with unobserved ability (in line with Dohmen et al., 2010), and the e↵ect
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of loss aversion on gambling and performance may be spurious. If this spurious e↵ect is suf-
ficiently strong, then more-loss-averse students perform worse even conditional on answering
a question, while the opposite holds true if the causal e↵ect dominates. One may expect that
this spurious channel matters most for students who do not answer all (or almost all) questions
and for students of a subpopulation that performs worse.
In contrast, we find evidence in support of the causal e↵ect in the subpopulation that is
less prone to answer all questions. We interpret this finding as support for our hypothesis that
more loss-averse students perform worse because they refrain from making some gambles that
would have increased their performance in expectation. In this subpopulation, we observe an
above-average fraction of students who do not have business administration or economics as
their main field of study. Interacting loss aversion with being a student in business adminis-
tration or economics, in the entire sample, we find evidence in support of the causal e↵ect for
other main fields of studies and the spurious e↵ect for business administration or economics.
The latter can be explained by business and economics students being inclined to answer all
questions in any case, which would diminish the causal e↵ect.
Our paper relates to several strands of literature. A growing empirical and experimen-
tal literature on choice under uncertainty provides evidence that individuals experience loss
aversion. In such environments, loss aversion was introduced through prospect theory by Kah-
neman and Tversky (1979) and modified by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Prospect theory
postulates an exogenous (status-quo-based) reference point, while Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006,
2007) endogenize the formation of reference points by their concept of expectation-based loss
aversion.2 Our analysis is compatible with both approaches: Either approach gives rise to the
same hypotheses that we use to predict students’ choices in the exam. Our elicitation of stu-
dents’ loss-aversion parameters follows Tversky and Kahneman (1992); interchangeably, we
could elicit them based on Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007).
DellaVigna (2009) provides an overview on empirical and experimental evidence of loss
aversion. Work on expectation-based loss aversion includes exchange and valuation experi-
ments (e.g. Ericson and Fuster, 2011), experiments in which participants are compensated for
exerting e↵ort in a tedious and repetitive task (e.g. Abeler et al., 2011), and sequential-move
tournaments (e.g. Gill and Prowse, 2012). Using field data, there is evidence that expectation-
2Bell (1985); Loomes and Sugden (1987); and Gul (1991) provide alternative theories that formalize that
expectations act as reference points.
4
based reference dependence a↵ects golf players’ performance (see Pope and Schweitzer, 2011)
and cabdrivers’ labor-supply decision (see Crawford and Meng, 2011).3 Regarding evidence
from the lab, close to our paper is Karle, Kirchsteiger, and Peitz (2015), who show that in-
dividual loss aversion parameters elicited through lotteries (as in the present paper), predict
consumption choice in an environment (encountered immediately after the lottery choice) in
which consumers initially face uncertainty regarding the purchase price. Our paper contributes
to this literature by documenting that behavior in a low-stake experimental task has predictive
power for behavior in a high-stake non-experimental task several months later.
Student behavior in multiple-choice tests has been analyzed in the literature on gender
e↵ects. Akyol et al. (2016) analyze student choice in the Turkish University Entrance Exam.
They infer from their data that women are more risk-averse. Funk and Perrone (2017) use field
data from an exam in microeconomics to analyze gender e↵ects. They introduce the treatment
that each student faces half of the questions with and half without penalty for responding
wrongly to a question. While women do generally better, women guess less with punishment
than men, which is consistent with our work. However, in Funk and Perrone (2017), women
benefit from this reluctance to answer questions. This result runs counter to our work, but
can be reconciled with the contrasting findings if one allows for the possibility that, in some
exams, students systematically underestimate the di culty of a question. Funk and Perrone
(2017) observe the students’ university entry grade—this is their measure of ability. They also
obtained individual measures of risk aversion from a lab experiment performed one year after
the exam. In their data set, women have on average higher ability. They find that risk aversion
has a zero e↵ect on scores on both parts of the exam, which is in line with our finding that
risk aversion does not have a significant e↵ect. Di↵erent from Funk and Perrone (2017), we
consider loss aversion as well as risk aversion.
More closely related, in a lab experiment with 406 participants, Baldiga (2014) analyzes
the interplay between gender e↵ects and risk attitudes. She collects students’ answers to ques-
3See, in particular, Camerer et al. (1997); Farber (2005, 2008, 2015) for work on cabdrivers’ labor-supply
decision, which partly challenge the findings of reference dependence. Fehr and Go¨tte (2007) provide evidence
on reference-dependence in labor supply from a field experiment with bike messengers. Further evidence on
expectation-based reference points includes Loomes and Sugden (1987) and Choi et al. (2007) for choices over
lotteries; Post et al. (2008) for gambling behavior in game shows; and Card and Dahl (2011) for disappointment-
induced domestic violence. Countervailing evidence is found in Smith (2018), He↵etz and List (2014), and
Gneezy et al. (2017). One explanation for negative results of Smith (2018) and He↵etz and List (2014) could
be that the way how subjects form expectations varies with details of the experimental design (see Ericson and
Fuster, 2014).
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tions in a SAT practise test in history considering treatments with and without penalty. She
finds that women answer relatively fewer questions with penalty than men. This gender gap
is partly explained by di↵erences in risk attitude, which she extracted in a di↵erent part of the
experiment. In her lab setting in which she observes answers for questions which participants
initially did not answer, she obtains a clean estimate of the e↵ect of skipping questions on
performance. She finds that skipping questions hurts performance. Our findings are broadly in
line with her findings in the sense that with penalty women are less likely to answer questions
than men. Baldiga (2014) considers lotteries with mixed domain which are suitable for iden-
tifying loss aversion. Her measure of risk attitude is the lowest success probability a subject
accepted—a measure which is linked to loss aversion. Di↵erent from Baldiga (2014), we ex-
tract measures of loss aversions from lottery choices that have been made three months prior to
the performance (and not at the same point in time) to explain performance in the field (rather
than in the lab) when stakes are high.4
II Risk Preferences and Behavior inMultiple-Choice Exams
In this section, we provide a theoretical framework to analyze student behavior in multiple-
choice exams when students are loss averse. We then derive several hypotheses and hint at the
extent to which these hypotheses are supported by the subsequent empirical analysis.
For each question k, there are several options to answer. We denote by pjk the probability
that a student thinks that answer j in question k is correct. Probability pk ⌘ max j{pjk} is her
perceived success probability in case she picks the answer that she believes most likely to be
correct, i.e. pk defines the probability that a student assigns to correctly answering question k.
A utility-maximizing student answers question k if pk is above a threshold p⇤ which depends
on the student’s risk preferences (i.e. risk aversion and loss aversion). If the reverse inequality
holds, pk < p⇤, a student should not answer this question. In the following, we specify the
threshold p⇤ as a function of a loss-aversion parameter but other parameters capturing, for
instance, risk aversion and confidence have qualitatively similar e↵ects on the threshold (we
leave them aside for brevity).
4University examinations arguably constitute a high stake environment in Germany, as students are concerned
about their grade. The grade in “introductory economics” enters the final grade of studies and is explicitly listed
in the final o cial transcript.
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In the exam, each student faces 30 questions. We treat them as a sequence of independent
decision problems, k 2 {1, ..., 30}, about each of which a student may experience loss aversion.
There are four possible answers to each question, j 2 {1, ..., 4}: a correct answer gives 3 points,
no answer 1 point, and an incorrect answer gives 0 points, as in the exam in our data set. This
defines a student’s payo↵ per question. Thus, a risk- and loss-neutral student should answer
the question if her success probability pk exceeds 1/3. For instance, pk   1/3 is implied if a
student can rule out one of the four possible answers to a question with probability one. If a
student, however, is risk-averse or loss-averse, pure randomization is not attractive at pk = 1/3,
i.e. the student’s threshold for answering a question is larger than 1/3.
We formalize loss aversion applying the power utility representation of Tversky and Kah-
neman (1992).
ui(z) =
8>>><>>>: z
  if z   0;
  ( z)  if z < 0;
(1)
where z denotes the material payo↵ relative to a reference point;   > 1 represents loss aversion;
and   2 (0, 1) represents diminishing sensitivity—i.e., risk aversion in gains and risk love in
losses (and vice versa for   > 1).5 In particular, we assume that ui(zk) describes student i’s
utility from question k, where zk = xk   rk, and xk describes the student’s score from question
k and rk her status-quo-based reference point. It seems natural to assume that the status quo
equals the score of the safe option (i.e., not answering) which leads to rk = 1 for all questions
k.6 Then, assuming   = 1 (see Section III.A, for a justification), the student is indi↵erent
between answering and not answering question k if and only if pk · (3 1)+ (1  pk) · (0 1) =
1   1, where the right-hand side results because not answering a question yields the reference
outcome of one for sure. This translates to the following threshold,
p⇤( ) ⌘  
  + 2
2 (1/3, 1].
Proposition 1. The threshold p⇤ above which a student answers a question is strictly increas-
ing in the degree of loss aversion  .
5For simplicity, we exclude the possibility of di↵erent degrees of diminishing sensitivity in the gain and the
loss domain.
6In Appendix C, we derive the same prediction using the loss aversion approach of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006,
2007) who postulate an expectation-based reference point instead of a status-quo-based one. Since the two
approaches give rise to the same hypotheses, they can be used interchangeably in our setup.
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The proof of this proposition follows directly from taking the first-order derivative of p⇤
with respect to  . Thus, we obtain the prediction that the larger is the degree of loss aversion
  the larger must be the student’s success probability pk in order to answer question k.
Denote byGk the cumulative distribution function over success probabilities pk in the pop-
ulation about question k and gk its density function. In the following, we will neglect the
index k wherever unambiguous. Note that the empirical distribution depends on the particular
question. It may also depend on the particular student population. Thus, it may depend on ob-
servable student characteristics including a student’s loss aversion parameter  . To formulate
our Hypotheses 1,1’,2, and 2’, we assume thatG does not depend on  . To address the possible
correlation of loss aversion and ability, we formulate Hypothesis 3. Denote 1  Gk(p⇤( )) the
fraction of students with loss-aversion parameter   who answer question k. Hence, since p⇤( )
is increasing in  , the fraction of students who answer question k is decreasing in  .
Hypothesis 1. Students are less likely to answer a question the more loss-averse they are.
Aggregated over all questions we obtain a prediction at the student level about the correla-
tion between the number of unanswered questions m and the loss aversion parameter  .
Hypothesis 1’: Students with a higher   answer fewer questions.
In our empirical analysis, we will provide strong support for Hypotheses 1 and 1’. Loss-
averse students should only answer if they are more confident about knowing the correct an-
swer. This also implies that overall they are more likely to give the correct answer, conditional
on answering (positive selection e↵ect). More formally, E[p   p⇤( )] = R 1p⇤( ) pg(p)dp/[1  
G(p⇤( ))] is increasing in  . This implies that conditional on answering a question, students
are more likely to give the correct answer the more loss-averse they are.
Hypothesis 2. Conditional on answering, students are more likely to give the correct answer
the more loss-averse they are.
Hypothesis 2’: For a given number of answered questions, more-loss-averse students give
more correct answers than less-loss-averse students.
In our empirical analysis, we provide support for Hypothesis 2’, but do not obtain sig-
nificant coe cients at the disaggregated level in support of Hypothesis 2 in the full sample;
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interestingly, we find support for Hypothesis 2 in some subsamples which are defined by main
field of study. We will justify below why it makes sense to control for main field of study.
We denote the e↵ect captured by these first hypotheses through which the degree of loss
aversion may a↵ect student choices the causal e↵ect. However, there may also be an alterna-
tive or spurious e↵ect through which the degree of loss aversion may a↵ect student choices.
A spurious e↵ect is present if (the unobserved part of) a student’s ability is negatively cor-
related with the degree of loss aversion.7 Then, less-loss-averse students have a distribution
function over success probabilities that first-order stochastically dominates that of more-loss-
adverse students. Suppose that the spurious e↵ect is present—i.e., a student’s degree of loss
aversion is an inverse proxy for her ability—but that the causal channel is closed down—i.e.,
the threshold p⇤ is independent of the degree of loss aversion. Denote the distribution of suc-
cess probabilities of students with loss-aversion parameter   by G(p;  ) and its density by
g(p;  ). Then, first-order stochastic dominance in favor of less-loss-averse students says that
more-loss-averse students reply less often because they have lower success probabilities; i.e.,
1  G(p⇤;  1) > 1  G(p⇤;  2) with  2 >  1 for any p⇤. In addition, students are then less likely
to give a correct answer the more loss-averse they are; i.e.
R 1
p⇤ pg(p;  1)dp >
R 1
p⇤ pg(p;  2)dp
(note that this is the overall probability, not the one conditional on answering). This constitutes
our third hypothesis we want to test.
Hypothesis 3. Students are less likely to give the correct answer the more loss-averse they
are.
There is a tension between Hypotheses 2 and 3. Suppose that only the spurious e↵ect
is present. The negative correlation between loss aversion and unobserved ability says that
conditional on answering a question, students are less likely to give the correct answer the more
loss-averse they are; i.e., for any p⇤,
R 1
p⇤ pg(p;  1)dp/(1   G(p⇤;  1)) >
R 1
p⇤ pg(p;  2)dp/(1  
G(p⇤;  2)) with  2 >  1 and so Hypothesis 2 is violated. Since (1 G(p⇤;  1)) > (1 G(p⇤;  2))
holds, a violation of Hypothesis 2 implies Hypothesis 3. In our empirical analysis we do not
find systematic support for Hypothesis 3.
We note that according to the causal and the spurious e↵ect there is support for Hypothesis
1. When both are present, Hypothesis 1 says that (1   G(p⇤( 1);  1)) > (1   G(p⇤( 2);  2))
with  2 >  1. If causal and spurious e↵ect are present, they go in opposite directions regarding
7In a di↵erent context, Dohmen et al. (2010) find a negative correlation.
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performance. Thus, statistically insignificant results when checking for Hypotheses 2 and
3 are possibly due to the joint presence of causal and spurious e↵ect. We investigate this
issue carefully in the empirical analysis below and find some support for Hypothesis 2 but not
support for Hypothesis 3.
Behavior may also be driven by risk aversion. A more-risk-averse student should be more
inclined to go for the safe bet (no answer) than a gamble. Thus, theory predicts that the
threshold probability is also an increasing function of the degree of risk aversion. This, would
give rise to hypotheses corresponding to Hypotheses 1 and 2 in which loss aversion is replaced
by risk aversion. However, as Rabin (2000) argues, risk aversion cannot plausibly explain
choice behavior in small-stake lotteries without implying absurd degrees of risk aversion in
high-stake gambles. Since we extracted the degree of risk aversion from lottery choice with
small stakes, we conjecture that our measure of risk aversion provides little predictive power—
as we will see, this is confirmed in our empirical analysis.
III Experimental Design
In the empirical analysis, we match data from the classroom (September 2013) to data in
the field (exam in December 2013).8 Our aim is to investigate whether student outcomes
in the introductory economics exam can be explained by student characteristics and inferred
preferences with respect to risk and losses.
III.A Data from the Classroom
Risk Preferences. We elicited a ranking of participants with respect to their choice behavior
on both, a mixed domain (including negative and positive payments) and a purely positive
domain. The former will be interpreted as loss aversion (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1992,
and Rabin, 2000) and the latter as risk aversion.
In particular, subjects have to choose between lotteries and sure payments.9 There were
two series of choices, with six choices each. First, subjects have to make six choices between
8We matched students based on student IDs in the experiment and in the exam; we anonymized the data after
the matching.
9Fehr and Go¨tte (2007), Ga¨chter et al. (2007), and Karle, Kirchsteiger, and Peitz (2015) used a similar way of
measuring loss aversion.
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a lottery that gave a 50-percent chance of winning 4 Euro and a 50-percent chance of losing
R, and, on the other hand, a sure payment of zero. R takes values  0.60,  1.20,  1.80,  2.40,
 3.00,  4.00 Euro (in series A; see Appendix D). To cover potential losses, each participant
received 6 Euro for participating in the survey. Second, subjects have to make six choices
between a lottery with a 50-percent chance of winning 4 Euro and a 50-percent chance of
winning zero, and, on the other hand, a sure payment of S (in series B; see Appendix D).
That payment takes values 0.40, 0.80, 1.20, 1.60, 2.00, or 2.40 Euro. These are standard lottery
tasks with and without losses.10 At the end of the experiment, one of the 12 choices was chosen
randomly and implemented.
For series A, subject i’s choice is characterized by a cuto↵ value Ri  0 such that all
lotteries with |R| > |Ri| are rejected, and all lotteries with |R|  |Ri| are accepted. Similarly,
for series B subject i’s choice is characterized by a cuto↵ value S i such that for any S < S i,
the lottery is chosen, and for any S   S i, the sure payment is preferred. These cuto↵ values
characterize our individual measures of loss aversion and risk aversion.
The power utility representation of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) in equation (1) incor-
porates a loss parameter   > 1 and a risk parameter   > 0. We next apply this representation to
identify our measures of loss aversion and risk aversion. First, according to Rabin (2000), risk
aversion cannot plausibly explain choice behavior in small-stake lotteries without implying
absurd degrees of risk aversion in high-stake gambles. In small-stake lotteries, people should
therefore be considered as risk-neutral. According to this view and in line with part of the
experimental literature (see, e.g., Ga¨chter et al., 2007), we assume that  i is equal to one for all
students. An individual measure of loss aversion  i can then be derived from the cuto↵ values
of series A using the cuto↵ condition 0 = 1/2 · 4 + 1/2 · (  i |Ri|), where the reference point
equals status quo of zero. The degree of loss aversion of participant i equals11
 i =
4
|Ri| . (2)
10The fact that both lottery outcomes are equally likely rules out that probability weighting has an e↵ect on our
measures of risk preferences (cf. Ko¨bberling and Wakker, 2005). This constitutes an advantage of our elicitation
methods of risk preferences over others that use binary lotteries with asymmetric probabilities (e.g. Holt and
Laury, 2002).
11For Ri = 0, we set  i equal to infinity. Also note that, similar to Proposition 1, we could apply the expected
total utility representation of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) to derive an alternative but qualitatively similar
measure of loss aversion. In that case, an expectation-based reference point instead of r = 0 had to be used.
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Second and in conflict with Rabin (2000)’s critique, cuto↵ values of series B can be used
to represent the risk parameter  i because all those lottery outcomes lie in the positive domain
(with r = 0).12 Using the condition that the utility of receiving S i with certainty must be equal
to the expected utility of getting 4 Euros with a 50-percent chance and zero otherwise, i.e.
1/2 · 4 i = S  ii , we obtain as an inverse measure for risk aversion,
 i =
ln(2)
ln(4)   ln(S i) . (3)
In our empirical analysis, we use r = 1   as our direct measure of risk aversion, reflecting the
degree of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). Even though we find evidence of risk aver-
sion in our sample, we find that this measure of risk preference is not powerful in predicting
behavior which is in line with Rabin (2000)’s calibration theorem.
We note that  i is increasing in Ri and  i is increasing in S i, as follows from equations (2)
and (3). While we use  i and 1    i as regressors in our empirical analysis, qualitative results
are confirmed if we use the cuto↵ values Ri and S i instead.
As an alternative specification, we combine the cuto↵s of series A and B in order to derive
a curvature-adjusted measure of loss aversion  ˜i. For given  i from series B and from the cuto↵
condition 0 = 1/2 · 4 i + 1/2 · (  ˜i)( Ri) i , we obtain the degree of loss aversion of subject i
 ˜i =
 
4
|Ri|
! i
. (4)
We provide the results of the empirical analysis with this alternative measure of loss aversion
in Appendix B. They show similar, slightly less significant coe cients. Note that, only in this
alternative specification, it is consistent with our identifying assumptions to consider loss and
risk aversion as explanatory variables in the same regression (cf. column 6 in Table 17 ↵.).
Also in these regressions, risk aversion is not a powerful predictor of behavior.
12Theoretically, allowing for a reference point larger than zero, lottery series B could be considered as having
a quasi-mixed domain. A natural candidate for a reference point larger than zero is the safe payment S i. In that
case, a measure of loss aversion in line with Rabin (2000)’s critique (i.e.   = 1) could be derived from series B
using the power utility representation of Tversky and Kahneman (1992). The cuto↵ condition 1/2 · (  Bi(S i  
0)) + 1/2 · (4   S i) = S i   S i leads to  Bi = (4   S i)/S i. This measure of loss aversion is strictly decreasing
in S i and highly positively correlated with 1    i leading to qualitatively similar regression results as 1    i in
all specifications. The regression results using  Bi can be obtained by the authors upon request. We interpret
the finding that the risk measures derived from lottery series B have less predictive power for explaining answer
behavior in the exam than those derived from lottery series A as evidence that students did not perceive lottery
series B as having a quasi-mixed domain but a positive one with r = 0.
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Other Explanatory Variables. The classroom experiment allowed us to obtain additional
variables, which we will use as controls in our empirical analysis. Each student took a cogni-
tive reflection test (CRT) as introduced by Frederick (2005). The outcome of this test consti-
tutes our measure of a student’s general ability.
In addition, we obtain a measure for the students’ confidence (cf. Hoppe and Kusterer,
2011). Students are asked about their estimates of the percentage of own correct answers to
a set of general interest questions and the average percentage of the others’ correct answers.
The di↵erence between the former and the latter is our measure of confidence. Furthermore,
we obtained the personal characteristics gender, age, and main field of study that we use as
further controls.13
The experiment was taken in the middle of the first term implying that topics in microeco-
nomics such as risk aversion and expected utility theory have not yet been covered in class.14
There was a three-month time span between experiment and the observed behavior in the field.
This suggests that any e↵ect between behavioral parameters extracted from the experimental
data on actual behavior is rather persistent.
III.B Field Data
In the field we observed the performance of each student in the final exam of the introductory
economics course. This course is taken by more than 1,000 students in economics, business
adminstration, business law, economics eduction, political science, sociology, and business
informatics; this class was taught in three sections. At the end of the course, students have to
take an exam, which fully determines the grade for the course. The exam took place around
three months after obtaining the lab data. Students who failed or missed the exam could retake
it a couple of months later. We decided to use data from the first exam only; we replicated the
13The introductory economics course is a mandatory course in economics, business administration, economics
education, business law, business informatics and an elective in a variety of other bachelor programs.
14An exception are business informatics students who tend to take the course in their third semester. However,
they did not take any other economics course prior to introductory economics. There are also a few students in
a higher semester retaking the course. We did not obtain access to this information and, thus, could not exclude
them from the sample, but we know that the number is low since student who fail the first exam after the course
take the second exam shortly before the following term. In addition, after a third failure, students are no longer
allowed to continue to study. With a failure rate of around 15 percent in an exam this implies that significantly less
than five percent retake the course. In addition, since course material does not change much over time, students
who retake the course often ask at the beginning of the term about any changes in the course material and then
stop attending (and, thus, will not be in our sample).
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analysis for the pooled sample confirming qualitatively our results (the significance of some
variable drops in a few instances).15
As mentioned above, the exam contained 30 multiple-choice questions. For each question,
there are four possible answers, one of which is correct and all others are false. Students
receive 3 points for each correct answer, 0 points for each wrong answer and 1 point for each
question without an answer. Thus, each student can make a total of 90 points;16 they know
that they will pass for sure with at least 50 points, but that the mapping between points and
grades will be done ex post (in particular, the threshold to pass may be set below 50 points).
Thus, since students do not know whether one additional point or correct answer improves
their grade, we believe that students typically do not “strategically” provide answers; i.e., we
do not expect them to guess more if they expect to be below the threshold. Hence, we assume
they do not answer a question if their subjective success probability is below the threshold and
they answer otherwise. We observe the individual answers to all questions; in particular, we
observe, how many and which questions the student did not answer, as well as how many and
which answers are correct.
In the first part of the empirical analysis, the student is the unit of observation. Summing
over the associated points, we obtain the total number of points a student reached—this is the
exam score. From the individual answers we construct a variable that approximates a student’s
propensity to gamble. Provided that a student was maximizing the expected number of points
she should not answer a question if the expected number of points is less than one.17 Suppose
that a question falls into either one of two categories for a student: she either knows the correct
answer for sure or does not know the correct answer for sure, assigns di↵erent probabilities
to the four options to answer, and the option with the highest probability has probability one
third. In the former case she would answer for sure and in the latter case the student would be
indi↵erent between choosing the best option and not answering. For example, such a situation
arises if she can exclude one of the options and assigns equal probability to the remaining
three options. With equal probability assigned to each remaining option, the student should
15We focused on the first exam for a number of reasons: re-sitters might perform di↵erently and would consti-
tute repeated observations; exam questions and possibly the overall exam di↵ered in di culty. Focusing on the
second exam only is no viable alternative since it provides too few observations.
16After the exam was written it turned out that one question did not have a unique correct answer; students
were assigned 3 points independent of whether and what they answered. We removed this question from our data
set leaving 29 questions with a maximal score of 87.
17This assumes risk- and loss-neutrality.
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expect to be wrong with probability 2/3. If we observe n wrong answers in a given exam,
in expectation, the student should have taken at least 3/2 times n gambles. Given that the
maximum probability to be correct will often be higher, this is a lower bound on the number
of gambles. The total number of questions where the student has some doubt then is (3/2)n
plus the number of unanswered questions m. As our measure of gambling, we define the rate
  =
3
2n
3
2n + m
.
Of course, this is a crude measure since we do not observe subjective probabilities of each
question. Clearly, apart from introducing noise one may be worried about introducing a bias.
According to our hypotheses, loss-averse students are less prone to gamble as they require a
higher threshold probability. If this hypothesis is correct, for loss averse students, the number
of wrong questions would need to be multiplied by a number larger than 3/2. We indirectly
address this issue, as we also regress the total number of answered questions on the degree of
loss aversion.
In the second part of the empirical analysis, each question for every student is the unit of
observation. Here, we view the decision to answer and the choice of the correct answer as
probabilistic outcomes.
IV Empirical Analysis and Results
IV.A Descriptives
In our matched data set, we have 646 students of which 367 are male and 279 female. Table 1
reports descriptive statistics from this data set.
In the exam, some students answered all remaining 29 questions;18 the lowest number
of answers is 11. This student should know that this may be su cient to pass the exam.19
Students answered on average around 24 questions.
As we can see from Figure 1, any number between 11 and 29 questions are answered
18As mentioned above, one of the 30 questions was not valid and, thus, had to be removed from the analysis.
19Even if she did not answer the question which was removed, she could get up to 33 points for 11 correct
answers and 19 points for not answering the remaining 19 questions, which gives 52 points and guarantees that
she passed.
15
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics:
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Answered Questions 646 23.9954 5.3095 11 29
Correct Answers 646 19.2740 5.7239 5 29
Exam Score 646 62.8266 13.0478 18 87
Propensity to Gamble 646 0.6981 0.2736 0.0811 1
Loss Aversion,  c 646 1.9814 0.7129 1 3
Risk Aversion, 1    c 646 0.1943 0.2880 -0.25 0.75
Confidence 645 -0.5189 1.7614 -7 5
Cognitive Reflection 646 1.7665 1.076 0 3
Age 646 19.4593 2.1767 16 37
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Figure 1: The number of answered questions
with a spike at all questions being answered. Students answer on average around 19 questions
correctly. As documented in Figure 2, the empirical support of the exam score is the interval
[30, 87] plus one outlier at 18. Descriptives on number of answered and correctly answered
questions di↵er by gender with a mean of 25.35 vs. 22.22 and 20.79 vs. 17.28 in favor of
male students, respectively (cf. Tables 13 and 14 in Appendix A which provide information
on descriptives by gender).
Main field of study is an important control, as student ability correlates with it and the
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Figure 2: Exam Score
ratio of female students varies by field—Tables 15 and 16 in Appendix A provide information
about main field of study and its correlation with our main variables of interest. In particular,
we split the sample in two subsamples, students of business administration or economics in
one group and all other students including those studying business law or business education in
the other group. As Figures 3 and 4 in the Appendix document, exam responses are markedly
di↵erent in both groups. A large fraction of students in business administration or economics
answer all or all but one questions and very few students answer less than 20 questions. By
contrast, students from other fields answer between 11 and all questions; the distribution is
much less skewed towards answering many questions than in the case of students in business
administration or economics.
As Figures 5 and 6 in Appendix A document, there is substantial heterogeneity across
questions regarding response rates and success rates in the exam.
The data from the classroom experiment allow us to measure individual risk preferences.
To avoid that the results depend on outliers, we categorize the measured degree of loss aver-
sion in three categories from “loss-neutral or weakly loss-averse” to “strongly loss-averse”.20
20Some students with the highest loss aversion score did not play a single loss lottery. This could be due to a
lack of understanding the choice setting or due to excessive scepticism towards lotteries with negative payo↵.
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We assign values
 ci =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1 “loss-neutral or weakly loss-averse”, if  i  1.67;
2 “loss-averse”, if  i 2 (1.67, 3.33];
3 “strongly loss-averse”, if  i > 3.33.
The median of the non-categorized variable is 1.99 and hence close to 2. The mean of the
categorized variable is 1.98 (as illustrated in Table 1). Table 2 contains the descriptives of the
mapping from cuto↵ values R in lottery series A (defined on in Section III.A) into categories
of loss aversion  c. According to our categorization, students with cuto↵ values R <  2 are
labelled “loss-neutral or weakly loss-averse” and those with R >  1 “strongly loss-averse”;
students with intermediate cuto↵ values are labelled “loss-averse”.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Cuto↵s in Lottery Series A and Loss Aversion Category
R  c
“loss-neutral or weakly loss-averse” “loss-averse” “strongly loss-averse”
1 2 3
-4 60 0 0
-3 53 0 0
-2.4 57 0 0
-1.8 0 199 0
-1.2 0 119 0
-0.6 0 0 77
0 0 0 81
Total 170 318 158
A choice in Lottery Series A is between a lottery with a 50-percent chance of winning 4 Euro and a
50-percent chance of losing |R|, and a sure payment of zero.
Similarly, we categorize the inverse measure of risk aversion from “risk-averse ” to “risk-
neutral or weakly risk-loving ”,
 ci =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0.25 “strongly risk-averse”, if  i  0.431;
0.75 “risk-averse”, if  i 2 (0.431, 1);
1.25 “risk-neutral or weakly risk-loving”, if  i   1.
The median of the non-categorized variable is 0.756 and, hence, close to 0.75. The mean of the
categorized variable is 0.806 (Table 1 illustrates the mean of our direct measure of risk aversion
1  ci which is 0.194). Table 3 contains the descriptives of the mapping from cuto↵ values S in
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lottery series B into categories of risk aversion 1  c. According to our categorization, students
with cuto↵ value S   2 are labelled “risk-neutral or weakly risk-averse” and those with S < 1
“strongly risk-averse”. Students with intermediate values are labelled “risk-averse”.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: Cuto↵s in Lottery Series B and Risk Aversion Category
S 1    c
“risk-neutral or weakly risk-loving” “risk-averse” “strongly risk-averse”
-0.25 0.25 0.75
0 0 0 29
0.4 0 0 9
0.8 0 0 37
1.2 0 160 0
1.6 0 264 0
2 59 0 0
2.4 88 0 0
Total 147 424 75
A choice in Lottery Series B is between a lottery with a 50-percent chance of winning 4 Euro and a
50-percent chance of winning zero, and a sure payment of S.
In addition, we ask students di cult general interest questions and also ask them to as-
sess their performance relative to the average student. This gives an estimate of students’
confidence which we measured in 10% steps (extracted from question 22 and 23 in the ques-
tionnaire; see Section III.A).21 The most-confident students expect to give 50% more correct
answers than the average student; the least-confident students expecting to give 70% fewer
correct answers than the average student. In the cognitive reflection test, students achieved a
score between 0 and 3 with a mean of 1.77 correct answers.
We checked for the correlation of  ci and 1    ci with the students’ age, gender, cognitive
reflection score and confidence. We find a highly significant, positive correlation between
our measure of loss aversion (from series A with mixed domain) and that of risk aversion
(from series B with positive domain) and a highly significant, negative correlation between
either one of them and confidence. Furthermore, our measure of loss aversion is negatively
correlated with students’ cognitive reflection score which gives rise to the presumption that
our measure of loss aversion catches some unobserved low ability of students in line with
21The direct measure of overconfidence based on a student’s assessment of her performance (see question 22
in the questionnaire) turned out to be less powerful, possibly because the general interest questions were di cult
and answers therefore noisy.
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Dohmen et al. (2010).22 The same sign holds for risk aversion. Additionally, for both risk
measures, risk appetite is lower for female students than for their male counterparts (cf. Tables
13 and 14 in the Appendix). There is no significant correlation of the risk measures with age.
Table 16 in the Appendix reports the correlation coe cients of the main variables and main
field of study. We note that the correlation coe cients between cognitive reflection score and
main field of study (cf. the first column of Table 16) are in line with the average high school
grade of students per field in 2013 (recorded in the admission process). In particular, students
of business administration or economics have the highest average high school grades (1.34
and 1.51 on a scale from 1 to 5 with 1 being the highest grade) and studying one of these
fields correlates significantly positively with thecognitive reflection score, whereas students of
business education have the lowest average high school grade (2.63) and studying business
education correlates significantly negatively with the cognitive reflection score.
IV.B Cross-Section Regressions
In this section we take a first shot at loss aversion as an explanatory variable of the students’
behavior in the exam and test Hypothesis 1’ and 2’. Table 4 reports OLS regression results with
the number of answered questions as the dependent variable. All independent variables are
extracted from the classroom experiment. We find that loss aversion (resp. confidence) have a
negative (resp. positive) impact on the number of answered questions.23 This e↵ect is highly
significant (at the 1% level), whereas there is only a slightly significant, negative impact of risk
aversion (at the 10% level). Cognitive reflection is strongly significant. There is a significant
gender di↵erence, even after controlling for loss aversion or risk aversion and confidence.
Including an interaction term of gender and loss aversion (or gender and confidence) would
not lead to significant coe cients of all gender variables. In all our regressions, we include
main field of study as fixed e↵ects. Our reading of the regression results is that we find strong
evidence in support of Hypothesis 1’. Our estimate suggests that ceteris paribus students in
the highest category of loss aversion answer 1 or 2 questions less.
In addition, we find that the gender e↵ect is partly explained by our measures of loss aver-
22Frederick (2005) finds that loss aversion is more prominent among subjects with a low cognitive reflection
score; see his Table 3b. For a survey on the link between risk preferences and cognitive ability, see Dohmen et al.
(2018).
23For one student in our sample, the confidence measure was missing. Thus, the number of observations drops
from 646 to 645 in column 4 to 6 in Table 4.
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Table 4: Number of Answered Questions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cognitive Reflection 0.561*** 0.474*** 0.541*** 0.504*** 0.425** 0.488***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.012) (0.004)
Loss Aversion -1.009*** -0.953***
(0.000) (0.000)
Risk Aversion -0.986* -0.838
(0.092) (0.150)
Confidence 0.340*** 0.316*** 0.328***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Gender (F.) -2.026*** -1.566*** -1.944*** -1.600*** -1.195*** -1.544***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Age 0.057 0.060 0.051 0.042 0.045 0.037
(0.528) (0.501) (0.571) (0.644) (0.611) (0.678)
Constant 21.916*** 25.903*** 21.226*** 25.738*** 29.522*** 25.151***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Field Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Obs. 646 646 646 645 645 645
R square 0.3855 0.4014 0.3883 0.3970 0.4110 0.3989
Table 4: P-values are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and
*, respectively.
sion and confidence (roughly 40% of it). Interestingly, risk aversion shows a much lower
significance than loss aversion (and confidence). We interpret this as evidence that a lottery
series with a positive domain is less well suited to elicit a measure of risk preferences that mat-
ter for high-stake lottery choices (with mixed domain) in the future than a lottery series with a
mixed domain. We refrain from using loss aversion and risk aversion as explanatory variables
in the same regression because this would be inconsistent with our identifying assumptions
(see, however, column 6 in Table 17 ↵. in Appendix B, where we consider our alternative
specification  ˜ which avoids this issue).
In the previous section we introduced another variable related to the inclination to answer
a question: the propensity to gamble. Using this dependent variable, our theory predicts that
more-loss-averse-students should have a lower propensity to gamble. This is indeed what we
find—see Table 5 for the regression results with the propensity to gamble as the dependent
variable. The e↵ect is highly significant (at the 1% level), whereas there is no significant
impact of the measure of risk aversion. Cognitive reflection is again significant (with “smarter”
people guessing more). In the regression in column 5, the gender e↵ect is only statistically
significant at the 10% level and loses more than half of its value compared to the specification
in which individual loss aversion and confidence are not included as explanatory variables
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Table 5: Propensity to Gamble
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cognitive Reflection 0.098*** 0.081** 0.097*** 0.087** 0.072** 0.087**
(0.004) (0.018) (0.005) (0.011) (0.035) (0.011)
Loss Aversion -0.198*** -0.188***
(0.000) (0.000)
Risk Aversion -0.057 -0.028
(0.631) (0.814)
Confidence 0.064*** 0.059*** 0.064***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Gender (F.) -0.304*** -0.214*** -0.299*** -0.224*** -0.145* -0.223***
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.003) (0.062) (0.003)
Age 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.010
(0.471) (0.446) (0.483) (0.578) (0.547) (0.583)
Constant -0.407 0.374 -0.447 0.231 0.976** 0.212
(0.310) (0.398) (0.275) (0.535) (0.020) (0.580)
Field Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Obs. 646 646 646 645 645 645
R square 0.2939 0.3111 0.2942 0.3050 0.3204 0.3051
Table 5: P-values are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and
*, respectively.
(see column 1). Thus, we find that the gender e↵ect, which says that women are more hesitant
to answer, is partly explained by our measures of loss aversion and confidence. Including
an interaction term of gender and loss aversion (or gender and confidence) would lead to
statistically insignificant coe cients of all gender variables.
If loss-averse students take too few gambles, a student’s performance should be worse if
she is more loss-averse; cf. Hypothesis 2’.24 Table 6 reports OLS regressions in which the
dependent variable is students’ exam score (in the standardized version). We find a significant
negative (resp. positive) coe cient of our measures of loss aversion (resp. confidence) on
exam score (at the 5% level), while also in this regression risk aversion enters less significantly
(at the 10% level). We interpret this result as evidence in support of Hypothesis 2’. Again, we
find that the gender e↵ect is partly explained by our measures of loss aversion and confidence.
In Table 7, we provide evidence that the significantly, negative e↵ect of loss aversion on
exam score almost fully vanishes when we include propensity to gamble as an explanatory
variable. This suggests that guessing less when it pays is indeed the mechanism through which
loss aversion a↵ects performance.
24Specifically, Hypothesis 2’ states that the conditional probability of answering a question correctly increases
in the degree of loss aversion. The underlying mechanism is that more loss-averse students are less likely to
answer a question than less loss-averse students, given that their expected gain in points is small. Missing out on
these relatively small expected gains implies, though, that they should perform worse on average.
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Table 6: Exam Score (std)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cognitive Reflection 0.121*** 0.111*** 0.117*** 0.112*** 0.104*** 0.109***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Loss Aversion -0.115** -0.107**
(0.015) (0.024)
Risk Aversion -0.202* -0.184*
(0.070) (0.099)
Confidence 0.045** 0.043** 0.043**
(0.019) (0.028) (0.028)
Gender (F.) -0.318*** -0.266*** -0.302*** -0.260*** -0.215*** -0.248***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001)
Age -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003
(0.993) (0.992) (0.937) (0.917) (0.936) (0.874)
Constant -0.317 0.139 -0.458 0.346 0.769* 0.217
(0.404) (0.741) (0.236) (0.329) (0.055) (0.550)
Field Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Obs. 646 646 646 645 645 645
R square 0.3682 0.3740 0.3715 0.3749 0.3798 0.3775
Table 6: P-values are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and
*, respectively.
IV.C Panel Data Estimation
In this section we consider a panel with students in the cross section and exam questions in
the longitudinal dimension (cf. Table 8 to 12) to test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. As an estimation
method, we use the random-e↵ect logit model on the individual level (with fixed e↵ects and
clustered standard errors at the field level, as we want to allow for heterogeneity to depend on
the main field of study).25
Loss aversion plays a highly significant role for students’ choice whether or not to answer
a question. As shown in Table 8, the coe cient of loss aversion is negatively significant at
the 1% level in all specifications, which is in support of Hypothesis 1. Cognitive reflection
shows a highly significant coe cient of expected sign in all regressions in this section. Our
measure of confidence also shows a highly significant positive coe cient. The coe cient
for female students is significantly negative. The size of the e↵ect drops when introducing
loss-aversion or confidence as explanatory variable or both. We further introduce a time trend
in both, the micro part (the first 15 questions) and the macro part (the second 15 questions)
of the exam. The reason is that the lecture is split into a micro and a macro part (taught by
25As an alternative, we also ran corresponding Poisson regressions for Tables 8 to 12, which confirm our
qualitative findings.
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Table 7: Exam Score (std)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cognitive Reflection 0.097*** 0.092*** 0.093*** 0.092*** 0.087*** 0.088***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Propensity to Gamble (std) 0.248*** 0.239*** 0.246*** 0.239*** 0.232*** 0.238***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Loss Aversion -0.068 -0.063
(0.143) (0.173)
Risk Aversion -0.188* -0.177
(0.081) (0.101)
Confidence 0.030 0.029 0.027
(0.113) (0.127) (0.147)
Gender (F.) -0.243*** -0.215*** -0.228*** -0.206*** -0.181** -0.195***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.012) (0.006)
Age -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005
(0.838) (0.852) (0.786) (0.801) (0.815) (0.759)
Constant -0.216 0.050 -0.348 0.290 0.544 0.166
(0.556) (0.903) (0.352) (0.397) (0.163) (0.636)
Field Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Obs. 646 646 646 645 645 645
R square 0.4115 0.4135 0.4143 0.4146 0.4163 0.4170
Table 7: P-values are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *,
respectively.
Table 8: Answer a Question
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cognitive Reflection 0.286** 0.251** 0.283** 0.267** 0.236** 0.266**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.020)
Loss Aversion -0.333*** -0.314***
(0.000) (0.000)
Risk Aversion -0.130 -0.072
(0.539) (0.755)
Confidence 0.106*** 0.098*** 0.105***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Gender (F.) -0.667*** -0.528*** -0.656*** -0.532*** -0.413** -0.528***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.018) (0.000)
Time Micro -0.704*** -0.703*** -0.704*** -0.702*** -0.702*** -0.702***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time Macro -1.350*** -1.350*** -1.350*** -1.347*** -1.348*** -1.347***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cognitive Reflection ⇥Micro -0.132*** -0.132*** -0.132*** -0.132*** -0.132*** -0.132***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 2.115*** 2.838*** 2.009*** 2.102*** 2.783*** 2.043***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Field Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Obs. 18,734 18,734 18,734 18,705 18,705 18,705
Table 8 : P-values are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and
*, respectively.
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di↵erent lecturers) and students may start with the micro or the macro part when answering
the exam. In all regressions in this section, the corresponding coe cients are significant at
a 5% level. They are negative in all columns of Table 8, indicating an increase in perceived
di culty per question in each part of the exam or an increasing time pressure. An interaction
of the cognitive reflection score with a dummy for the micro part shows a highly significant
coe cient, whose sign is negative. Since the micro part tends to be more analytical than the
macro part, it is not surprising that the e↵ect of the CRT depends on whether a question is
from the micro or the macro part. Our main take-away from this regression is that we find
strong support for Hypothesis 1 and also confirm the result in the cross-section regression that
the gender e↵ect in answering a question is partly explained by our measures of loss aversion
and confidence (about 40% of it; cf. column 1 and 5).
As shown in Section II, a higher coe cient of loss aversion positively a↵ects the students’
response probability due to the causal or the spurious channel, or possibly both. If the causal
e↵ect dominates, we should also find empirical support for Hypothesis 2, whereas if the spu-
rious e↵ect dominates, we should find empirical support for Hypothesis 3.
Table 9: Correct Answer, Conditionally On Answering
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cognitive Reflection 0.142*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.138*** 0.136*** 0.136***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Loss Aversion -0.022 -0.019
(0.681) (0.728)
Risk Aversion -0.117 -0.111
(0.362) (0.412)
Confidence 0.014 0.014 0.012
(0.505) (0.509) (0.594)
Gender (F.) -0.143*** -0.133* -0.133*** -0.124 -0.116 -0.116
(0.005) (0.056) (0.003) (0.107) (0.206) (0.103)
Time Micro -1.081*** -1.081*** -1.081*** -1.089*** -1.089*** -1.088***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time Macro -0.632*** -0.632*** -0.632*** -0.637*** -0.637*** -0.637***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cognitive Reflection ⇥Micro -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.094***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 1.575*** 1.621*** 1.480*** 1.579*** 1.618*** 1.490***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Field Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Obs. 15,501 15,501 15,501 15,473 15,473 15,473
Table 9: P-values are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and
*, respectively.
25
In Table 9, we report the estimates of students’ conditional success probability; i.e., the
probability that a student answers a question correctly conditional on answering it. According
to these estimates, at a first look, we do not find empirical support for Hypothesis 2, i.e., that
a more-loss-averse student has a higher conditional success probability than a less-loss-averse
student (cf. the negative and insignificant coe cient for loss aversion in columns 2 and 5). We
also find that confidence and risk aversion are never significant. With this whole sample we
do not find support for Hypothesis 2. While this may suggest that both the causal and spurious
e↵ect essentially cancel each other out, we will take a closer look at the data next and come to
a di↵erent conclusion.
An explanation for the insignificance of loss aversion might be related to the observation
that a large number of students answered all or almost all questions; cf. Figure 1, in which
we see a spike at answering 28 and 29 questions, whereas we do not observe such a spike
at high exam scores, cf. Figure 2. The latter spike would have indicated that indeed many
students did extremely well at the exam. Yet, this was not the case. The issue may be that,
in contrast to what we postulated above, some students do not view the exam as a collection
of independent decision problems and, in particular, feel inclined to answer all questions. To
remove behavior stemming from the temptation to answer all or most questions, we look at
two specifications. We preview these analyses: First, we look at a sub-sample of answers by
students who did not answer at least two questions and find empirical support for Hypothesis
2. However, this sample split is based on choices. Second, we observe that students with main
field of study for which introductory economics constitutes a core field course (economics
or business administration) are likely to answer all or almost all questions, but students from
other fields are less likely to do so. We therefore include an interaction term between main
field of study and loss aversion and find support for Hypothesis 2 among students whose major
is neither economics nor business administration.
Taking a closer look at the first specification, the sample split is between students who
answered 27 and fewer questions and those who answered 28 or 29 questions. This is pro-
vided in Table 10 (cf. columns 1 to 3 for the former and columns 4 to 6 for the latter).26 As
Table 10 reveals, the coe cient of loss aversion is significantly positive when students answer
few questions and significantly negative when they respond to many. This suggests that the
26Many students apparently deemed questions 18 and slightly less so 14 too di cult and, thus, did not answer.
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Table 10: Correct Answer, Conditionally On Answering by Subsamples (low sum of answered
questions in columns (1)-(3); high sum in (4)-(6))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cognitive Reflection 0.137*** 0.146** 0.135*** 0.098*** 0.103*** 0.093***
(0.006) (0.013) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003)
Loss Aversion 0.072*** -0.164***
(0.009) (0.010)
Risk Aversion -0.089 -0.249***
(0.733) (0.000)
Gender (F.) -0.130** -0.151** -0.123*** -0.026 0.078 0.003
(0.036) (0.011) (0.003) (0.774) (0.538) (0.970)
Time Micro -1.015*** -1.014*** -1.015*** -1.174*** -1.174*** -1.174***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time Macro -0.739*** -0.738*** -0.739*** -0.484*** -0.484*** -0.484***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cognitive Reflection ⇥Micro -0.166*** -0.166*** -0.166*** -0.015* -0.015* -0.015*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.086) (0.075) (0.082)
Constant 1.544*** 1.370*** 1.471*** 1.827*** 2.037*** 1.639***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Field Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Obs. 7,959 7,959 7,959 7,542 7,542 7,542
Table 10: P-values are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **,
and *, respectively.
causal e↵ect is dominant for the former and that the spurious e↵ect is dominant for the latter.27
Overall, we read our findings as providing strong support of Hypothesis 2 for the subsample of
students who do not answer all or almost all questions. Furthermore, column 3 and 6 show that
risk aversion does not play an important role. Its coe cient is always negative but statistically
insignificant, at least for students who answer only few questions.
As alluded to above, the splitting of the sample may be criticized, as it is based on endoge-
nous choices. As an alternative approach, we condition on the main field of study. Choice
behavior by students with business administration or economics as their major field of study
tends to be di↵erent from those with a di↵erent main field of study—the former have, on aver-
age, higher grades in the exam. As Figure 3 and 4 in Appendix A document, being a student
in business administration or economics and having a high answer ratio are strongly positively
correlated. We therefore include an interaction term between main field of study and loss
aversion.
27In this subsample, we find that more loss-averse students perform worse, which is compatible with the
spurious e↵ect being dominant. An explanation is that the subsample may consist mainly of observations from
students who feel compelled to answer all questions. For these students, the causal e↵ect is suppressed.
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Table 11: Correct Answer, Conditionally On Answering using Interaction with Field Clusters
(Business Administration and Economics vs. the other fields)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cognitive Reflection 0.140*** 0.147*** 0.144*** 0.144***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Loss Aversion -0.022 0.051*** 0.058*** 0.050***
(0.681) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Loss Aversion ⇥ Business, Econ -0.143*** -0.149*** -0.133***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Confidence 0.015 -0.002
(0.589) (0.832)
Confidence ⇥ Business, Econ 0.034***
(0.000)
Gender (F.) -0.133* -0.121 -0.102 -0.103
(0.056) (0.201) (0.407) (0.405)
Time Micro -1.081*** -1.080*** -1.087*** -1.087***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time Macro -0.632*** -0.632*** -0.637*** -0.637***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cognitive Reflection ⇥Micro -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.094*** -0.094***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 1.621*** 1.444*** 1.433*** 1.449***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Field Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Obs. 15,501 15,501 15,473 15,473
Table 11: P-values are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **,
and *, respectively.
To check for evidence for Hypothesis 2, we take a look at regression results in Table 11
including the interaction term.28 In column 2 the coe cient for loss aversion is positive and
statistically significant (at the 1% level). It applies to main fields of study other than business
administration and economics. Hence, our evidence is in line with Hypothesis 2. Note that
this also rules out that in our sample only the spurious e↵ect is present (which otherwise could
have been a sign that our measure of loss aversion only picked up unobserved ability).
Also in column 2 loss aversion interacted with business administration or economics as
main field of study has a negative and statistically significant coe cient (at the 1% level). The
overall e↵ect of loss aversion for students in business administration or economics is negative
and statistically significant (at the 1% level by a separate Wald test).This means that, for this
group, more-loss-averse students answered more questions incorrectly than less-loss-averse
28We use clustered standard errors based on the “broad” field of study with one cluster consisting of all obser-
vations from students in business administration or economics and the other of all observations stemming from
other students.
28
ones and the spurious e↵ect seems to dominate.
Interestingly, the inclusion of the interaction term between loss aversion and field of study
also renders the gender e↵ect statistically insignificant at the 10% level (compare the statisti-
cally significant, negative coe cient of gender in column 1). Column 3 and 4 show that the
inclusion of confidence or its interaction with being a student in business administration or
economics does not alter the above finding.29
Table 12: Incorrect or no Answer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cognitive Reflection -0.234*** -0.238*** -0.234*** -0.238*** -0.250*** -0.253***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Loss Aversion -0.040 -0.153** -0.154**
(0.598) (0.045) (0.044)
Risk Aversion 0.042
(0.727)
Confidence 0.008 0.006
(0.723) (0.775)
Loss Aversion ⇥ Business, Econ 0.223*** 0.226***
(0.000) (0.000)
Gender (F.) 0.018 0.036 0.015 0.028 0.017 0.023
(0.835) (0.735) (0.858) (0.796) (0.860) (0.842)
Time Micro 0.513*** 0.512*** 0.513*** 0.503*** 0.511*** 0.501***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time Macro -0.423** -0.423** -0.423** -0.436** -0.424** -0.437**
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.043) (0.039) (0.043)
Cognitive Reflection ⇥ Time Micro 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.093 0.088 0.094
(0.210) (0.210) (0.210) (0.185) (0.208) (0.184)
Cognitive Reflection ⇥ Time Macro 0.329*** 0.329*** 0.329*** 0.335*** 0.329*** 0.336***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cognitive Reflection ⇥Micro 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.139*** 0.140*** 0.140***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant -1.536*** -1.452*** -1.501*** -1.533*** -1.176*** -1.171***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Field Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Obs. 18,734 18,734 18,734 18,705 18,734 18,705
Table 12: P-values are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **,
and *, respectively.
Table 12 reports the estimates of a regression explaining the probability of not providing
the correct answer; i.e., of not answering or answering wrongly. If only the spurious e↵ect is
present or at least dominates the causal e↵ect, Hypothesis 3 must hold and more-loss-averse
29The coe cient of confidence does not significantly di↵er from zero, only its interaction with being a stu-
dent in business administration or economics does. It is highly significant and positive, which indicates that
more-confident students in business administration or economics are more successful when choosing to answer a
question.
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students have a lower success probability. A positive coe cient for loss aversion would indi-
cate that this is the case and, thereby, would provide support of Hypothesis 3—that is, condi-
tional on their cognitive reflection score, more-loss-averse students are less likely to answer
questions and less likely to give a correct answer. The estimation results in columns 5 and 6
provide evidence for Hypothesis 3 for students in business administration or economics. For
those students loss aversion has an overall positive and statistically significant coe cient (at
the 1% level by a separate Wald test) explaining the probability of incorrect results (wrong
or no answer). For students in other fields, however, this e↵ect is negative and statistically
significant (at the 1% level). As the remaining columns show, confidence and risk aversion
do not have any significant e↵ect. Gender shows an statistically insignificant coe cient in all
regressions.
Overall, we read our findings as evidence in support of the causal e↵ect of loss aversion,
at least for students who are rather unlikely to answer all or almost all questions. For other
students, who for other reasons consider it appropriate to answer all questions, the spurious
e↵ect appears to dominate.
V Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we show that more-loss-averse students are less inclined to answer an exam ques-
tion if a wrong answer gives a lower score than no response. Thus, if students have the correct
probabilistic assessment, more-loss-averse students will perform worse. Loss aversion param-
eters are extracted from a classroom experiment of lottery choices conducted three months
prior to the exam.30 As we show, loss aversion in such a low-stake environment explains per-
formance in a di↵erent, high-stake environment a couple of months down the road. As we
also show, risk aversion does not explain behavior.31 Furthermore, we find a gender gap; this
gender gap is partly explained by gender di↵erences in the inferred loss-aversion parameters.
According to a university directive, the di↵erential treatment of wrong and no responses
was no longer allowed after 2013, which is the exam year we used in this paper. In 2014,
30Our elicitation method can easily be used in classroom experiments and could even be integrated into surveys
because it relies on a small number of lottery choices.
31In our questionnaire, we also obtained a non-incentivized measure of risk preferences and a measure of regret
(see instructions; questions about behavior I and II). We checked that also these measures do not explain behavior
in the exam.
30
we observe that the gender di↵erence in exam score was reduced. Controlling for field fixed
e↵ects and normalizing the coe cient of the gender dummy by its standard error, we estimate
a gender gap in favor of male students of only 4.70 (with a sample of 1008 students) in 2014
instead of 7.16 (with a sample of 936 students) in 2013; the R2 in the regression was 0.294
in 2014 and 0.380 in 2013, respectively.32 Assuming that the level of di culty and the pool
of students in both exams was similar, this finding can be explained by loss aversion: the
more-loss-averse gender was less disadvantaged by the new multiple choice setup according
to which incorrect answers were not punished and, thus, answering became the preferred ac-
tion for all questions irrespective of the degree of loss aversion. This suggests that the exam
with punishment for incorrect answers partly measured loss aversion rather than ability, which
warrants caution in the use of such punishment.
32Variables on cognitive reflection and risk preferences are not available for 2014.
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Appendix
A Further Descriptive Statistics
A.A Tables
Table 13: Descriptive Statistics: Male Students
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Answered Questions 367 25.3488 4.6452 11 29
Correct Answers 367 20.7929 5.2641 5 29
Exam Score 367 66.0300 12.4058 18 87
Propensity to Gamble 367 0.7541 0.2623 0.0811 1
Loss Aversion 367 1.7684 0.6802 1 3
Risk Aversion 367 0.1505 0.2796 -0.25 0.75
Confidence 366 0.03989 1.6360 -4.6 5
Cognitive Reflection 367 2.054 0.9903 0 3
Age 367 19.4092 2.4678 16 37
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics: Female Students
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Answered Questions 279 22.2151 5.6035 11 29
Correct Answers 279 17.2760 5.6992 6 29
Exam Score 279 58.6129 12.6889 30 87
Propensity to Gamble 279 0.6249 0.2716 0.0968 1
Loss Aversion 279 2.2616 0.6567 1 3
Risk Aversion 279 0.2518 0.2892 -0.25 0.75
Confidence 279 -1.2518 1.6501 -7 3
Cognitive Reflection 279 1.3901 1.0690 0 3
Age 279 19.5248 1.7252 17 27
Table 15: Descriptive Statistics: Students per field
Field Obs Freq. % Female
Business Administration 249 38.54 37.35
Business Law 136 21.05 42.65
Business Education 107 16.56 68.22
Economics 99 15.33 31.31
Others 55 8.51 43.64
Total 646 100.00 43.19
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Table 16: Descriptive Statistics: Correlation coe cients of main variables and field of study
Field Cognitive R. Loss A. Risk A. Confidence Gender (F.)
Business Administration 0.1549*** -0.0776** 0.0787** -0.0246 -0.0934**
(0.000) (0.049) (0.045) (0.533) (0.018)
Business Law -0.0728* 0.0081 -0.0538 0.0010 -0.0056
(0.065) (0.837) (0.172) (0.980) (0.886)
Business Education -0.3068*** 0.0584 -0.0718* -0.0907** 0.2252***
(0.000) (0.138) (0.068) (0.021) (0.000)
Economics 0.1830*** 0.0111 0.0147 0.0591 -0.1020**
(0.000) (0.778) (0.710) (0.134) (0.010)
Others 0.0087 0.0313 0.0180 0.0856** 0.0028
(0.826) (0.427) (0.648) (0.030) (0.944)
Table 16: P-values are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **,
and *, respectively.
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Figure 3: The number of answered questions (Business and Econ)
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Figure 5: Ratio of answers per question and ratio of correct answers (relative to total number
of students) per question; sorted
Figure 5 illustrates that students’ perception of the di culty of a question (measured by
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ratio of answers per question) and the actual ratio of correct answers are highly positively
correlated. The correlation coe cient is 0.8866. The ratio of correct answers in Figure 5 is
defined relative to the total number of students instead of the number of students who answered
a particular question. This definition implies that the red line can at most touch the blue but
never cross it. Questions are sorted by the ratio of answers per question, i.e. from questions
which are perceived as di cult to those perceived as easy. Therefore the blue line is increasing
by construction. The red line does not always move parallel to the blue line. It does so for the
questions which are perceived as the most easy and the most di cult ones but not necessarily
for questions perceived as intermediately di cult. Figure 6 is a di↵erent representation in
which questions are in the original order.
.2
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Answer Ratio Correct Answer Ratio
Figure 6: Ratio of answers per question and ratio of correct answers (relative to total number
of students) per question; unsorted
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B Alternative Specification of the Degree of Loss Aversion
In this appendix, we provide the results of the empirical analysis when the alternative, curvature-
adjusted measure of loss aversion is used, which incorporates the cuto↵s of both, series A and
B (cf. (4)).
We also categorized the alternative measure of loss aversion in three categories:
 ˜ci =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1 “loss-neutral or weakly loss-averse”, if  ˜i  1.5;
2 “weakly loss-averse”, if  ˜i 2 (1.5, 2];
3 “strongly loss-averse”, if  ˜i > 2.
The median of the non-categorized variable is 1.83 and hence similar to 2. The mean of the
categorized variable is 2.076. 171 students are in category  ˜ci = 1, 255 in category  ˜
c
i = 2, and
220 category  ˜ci = 3.
B.A Cross-Section Regressions
The comparison of Table 4 vs. 17, Table 5 vs. 18, and Table 6 vs. 19, respectively shows that
the alternative (or more precisely; curvature-adjusted) measure of loss aversion leads to only
slightly less significant coe cients when the number of answered questions and propensity to
gamble is the dependent variable. Its coe cient is less significant (and even insignificant at
a 10% level) when exam score is the dependent variable. Considering loss aversion and risk
aversion in the same regression does not a↵ect the size and significance of their coe cients
noticeably (cf. column 6, respectively).
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Table 17: Number of Answered Questions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cognitive Reflection 0.561*** 0.524*** 0.541*** 0.504*** 0.469*** 0.450***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008)
Loss Aversion -0.594*** -0.578*** -0.606***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006)
Risk Aversion -0.986* -0.958*
(0.092) (0.099)
Confidence 0.340*** 0.338*** 0.324***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gender (F.) -2.026*** -1.772*** -1.944*** -1.600*** -1.357*** -1.282***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Age 0.057 0.045 0.051 0.042 0.030 0.024
(0.528) (0.617) (0.571) (0.644) (0.741) (0.787)
Constant 21.916*** 24.521*** 21.226*** 25.738*** 28.376*** 27.830***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Field Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Obs. 646 646 646 645 645 645
R square 0.3855 0.3923 0.3883 0.3970 0.4034 0.4059
Table 17: P-values are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **,
and *, respectively.
Table 18: Propensity to Gamble
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cognitive Reflection 0.098*** 0.089*** 0.097*** 0.087** 0.079** 0.077**
(0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.011) (0.021) (0.023)
Loss Aversion -0.148*** -0.145*** -0.147***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Risk Aversion -0.057 -0.057
(0.631) (0.627)
Confidence 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.063***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Gender (F.) -0.304*** -0.241*** -0.299*** -0.224*** -0.163** -0.159**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.034) (0.041)
Age 0.013 0.010 0.013 0.010 0.007 0.007
(0.471) (0.575) (0.483) (0.578) (0.693) (0.707)
Constant -0.407 0.240 -0.447 0.231 0.893** 0.860**
(0.310) (0.589) (0.275) (0.535) (0.035) (0.045)
Field Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Obs. 646 646 646 645 645 645
R square 0.2939 0.3057 0.2942 0.3050 0.3164 0.3166
Table 18: P-values are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **,
and *, respectively.
B.B Panel Data Estimation
Next, we consider the results of the panel regressions when the alternative measure of loss
aversion is used. Comparing Table 8 vs. 20, Table 9 vs. 21, Table 10 vs. 22, and Table 12 vs.
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Table 19: Exam Score (std)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cognitive Reflection 0.121*** 0.119*** 0.117*** 0.112*** 0.110*** 0.106***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Loss Aversion -0.044 -0.040 -0.046
(0.310) (0.346) (0.283)
Risk Aversion -0.202* -0.193*
(0.070) (0.084)
Confidence 0.045** 0.045** 0.042**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.029)
Gender (F.) -0.318*** -0.300*** -0.302*** -0.260*** -0.243*** -0.228***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Age -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004
(0.993) (0.952) (0.937) (0.917) (0.879) (0.829)
Constant -0.317 -0.126 -0.458 0.346 0.529 0.419
(0.404) (0.766) (0.236) (0.329) (0.190) (0.305)
Field Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Obs. 646 646 646 645 645 645
R square 0.3682 0.3692 0.3715 0.3749 0.3757 0.3787
Table 19: P-values are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **,
and *, respectively.
23, respectively, we find that overall, the coe cient of loss aversion is slightly less significant
than that in the main text. Nevertheless, loss aversion has a positively significant impact on
answering correctly in the subsample of students with a low number of answered questions at
the 5% level (cf. column 2 of Table 22). Again, considering loss aversion and risk aversion in
the same regression does not a↵ect the size and the significance of their coe cients noticeably
(cf. column 6, respectively).
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Table 20: Answer a Question
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cognitive Reflection 0.286** 0.269** 0.283** 0.267** 0.251** 0.248**
(0.014) (0.011) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019)
Loss Aversion -0.238** -0.232** -0.237**
(0.033) (0.026) (0.019)
Risk Aversion -0.130 -0.134
(0.539) (0.490)
Confidence 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.103***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Gender (F.) -0.667*** -0.576*** -0.656*** -0.532*** -0.445** -0.435**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.016) (0.012)
Time Micro -0.704*** -0.704*** -0.704*** -0.702*** -0.702*** -0.702***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time Macro -1.350*** -1.350*** -1.350*** -1.347*** -1.347*** -1.347***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cognitive Reflection ⇥Micro -0.132*** -0.132*** -0.132*** -0.132*** -0.132*** -0.132***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 2.115*** 2.614*** 2.009*** 2.102*** 2.587*** 2.489***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Field Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Obs. 18,734 18,734 18,734 18,705 18,705 18,705
Table 20 : P-values are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **,
and *, respectively.
Table 21: Correct Answer, Conditionally On Answering
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cognitive Reflection 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.140*** 0.138*** 0.139*** 0.137***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Loss Aversion 0.012 0.014 0.011
(0.873) (0.857) (0.881)
Risk Aversion -0.117 -0.109
(0.362) (0.375)
Confidence 0.014 0.014 0.012
(0.505) (0.496) (0.584)
Gender (F.) -0.143*** -0.149** -0.133*** -0.124 -0.130 -0.121
(0.005) (0.034) (0.003) (0.107) (0.160) (0.152)
Time Micro -1.081*** -1.081*** -1.081*** -1.089*** -1.088*** -1.088***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time Macro -0.632*** -0.631*** -0.632*** -0.637*** -0.636*** -0.636***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cognitive Reflection ⇥Micro -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.094***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 1.575*** 1.549*** 1.480*** 1.579*** 1.550*** 1.469***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Field Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Obs. 15,501 15,501 15,501 15,473 15,473 15,473
Table 21: P-values are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **,
and *, respectively.
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Table 22: Correct Answer, Conditionally On Answering by Subsamples (low sum of answered
questions in columns (1)-(3); high sum in (4)-(6))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cognitive Reflection 0.137*** 0.147** 0.135*** 0.098*** 0.102*** 0.093***
(0.006) (0.020) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003)
Loss Aversion 0.110** -0.138**
(0.020) (0.042)
Risk Aversion -0.089 -0.249***
(0.733) (0.000)
Gender (F.) -0.130** -0.158*** -0.123*** -0.026 0.062 0.003
(0.036) (0.003) (0.003) (0.774) (0.651) (0.970)
Time Micro -1.015*** -1.013*** -1.015*** -1.174*** -1.174*** -1.174***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time Macro -0.739*** -0.737*** -0.739*** -0.484*** -0.484*** -0.484***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cognitive Reflection ⇥Micro -0.166*** -0.166*** -0.166*** -0.015* -0.015* -0.015*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.086) (0.087) (0.082)
Constant 1.544*** 1.290*** 1.471*** 1.827*** 2.013*** 1.639***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Field Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Obs. 7,959 7,959 7,959 7,542 7,542 7,542
Table 10: P-values are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **,
and *, respectively.
C Alternative Specification of the Threshold above which a
Student answers a Question
As an alternative approach to derive a threshold above which a student answers a question k, in
this appendix, we apply the concept of expectation-based loss aversion by Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2006, 2007). Similar to the threshold p⇤ derived in the main text, this alternative threshold
p⇤⇤ is increasing in   > 1.
An expectation-based loss-averse student with success probability pk and a degree of loss
aversion of   uses her expected score from answering question k as her reference point rk
which is equal to pk · 3 + (1   pk) · 0 = 3pk. Her gain-loss utility is derived as follows. With
probability pk, she gives the correct answer to question k and gets 3 points. She will therefore
experience a gain of 3 rk = 3(1 pk). With probability 1 pk, her answer turns out to be wrong
and she gets 0. She will therefore su↵er a loss of   · (0   rk) =  3pk . Her expected gain-loss
utility then equals pk ·3(1  pk)+ (1  pk) · ( 3pk ) which simplifies to  3pk(1  pk)(  1). Her
expected total utility additionally includes the expected value of answering question k, 3pk.
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Table 23: Incorrect or no Answer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cognitive Reflection -0.234*** -0.238*** -0.234*** -0.238*** -0.250*** -0.253***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Loss Aversion -0.045 -0.172 -0.173
(0.640) (0.188) (0.172)
Risk Aversion 0.042 0.005
(0.727) (0.961)
Confidence 0.008 0.008
(0.723) (0.750)
Loss Aversion ⇥ Business, Econ 0.248** 0.251**
(0.033) (0.027)
Gender (F.) 0.018 0.038 0.015 0.028 0.012 0.019
(0.835) (0.727) (0.858) (0.796) (0.904) (0.865)
Time Micro 0.513*** 0.512*** 0.513*** 0.503*** 0.511*** 0.501***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time Macro -0.423** -0.423** -0.423** -0.436** -0.424** -0.436**
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.043) (0.039) (0.043)
Cognitive Reflection ⇥ Time Micro 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.093 0.088 0.094
(0.210) (0.210) (0.210) (0.185) (0.209) (0.184)
Cognitive Reflection ⇥ Time Macro 0.329*** 0.329*** 0.329*** 0.335*** 0.329*** 0.335***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cognitive Reflection ⇥Micro 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.139*** 0.140*** 0.140***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant -1.536*** -1.442*** -1.501*** -1.533*** -1.135*** -1.128***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Field Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Obs. 18,734 18,734 18,734 18,705 18,705 18,705
Table 23: P-values are in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **,
and *, respectively.
Her expected total utility of not answering question k equals 1. To obtain the threshold, we
have to set the expected total utility of answering question k (with a weight ⌘ = 1 on gain-loss
utility relative to consumption utility) equal to that of not answering the question,
3pk   3pk(1   pk)(    1) = 1.
From this equation, the threshold p⇤⇤ can be derived as a function of   > 1,
p⇤⇤( ) ⌘ 2p
3 ( (3    8) + 8)   3(    2) 2 (1/3, 1].
The slope is equal to
dp⇤⇤( )
d 
=
  +
p
3
p
 (3    8) + 8   4
2
p
3(    1)2p (3    8) + 8
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For     1 , p⇤⇤( ) is strictly increasing in   because dp⇤⇤( )/d  is a hyperbola with dp⇤⇤( )/d  >
0 in this range.
D Instructions
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Dear Participant, 
 
 
First of all, we would like to thank you very much for participating in this experiment! 
In total, participation in this experiment does not last longer than 60 minutes. 
All data collected will be treated anonymously. Therefore we would like to ask you not to 
mark the questionnaires by name. 
 
The experiment consists of personal questions, test questions, questions about your risk 
behaviour and questions about your participation in various lotteries. For the lottery questions, 
a monetary payment will be made. You will receive 6 Euro for your participation in this 
experiment. In the lottery part you can win or lose up to 4 Euro in addition, i.e. you receive 
between 2 and 10 Euro. 
 
Please do not talk to other participants during the whole experiment, do not look at other 
participants' sheets and do not use any electronic devices. Please fill in the form yourself. The 
experiment takes place under similar conditions to writing a written exam. If you violate these 
fair play rules, we will immediately collect your sheet and exclude you from the experiment 
and all payouts. 
 
 
What's your student ID? We need your student ID to clearly identify you when you collect 
your monetary payment after the experiment. During the evaluation of this study, all your 
data will be anonymized so that no conclusions can be drawn about your person. We will 
not associate your decisions with your name.  
 
Student ID ________________  
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Personal questions: 
 
1. Do you agree with the anonymous evaluation of your data? 
 
yes  (please fill in the remaining questions) 
no   (please put your pen aside and sit still without disturbing your fellow students) 
 
2. How old are you? 
 
___ years 
 
 
3. Please tick your gender: 
 
f      m  
 
 
4. What semester are you in? 
 
___ Semester 
 
 
5. What is your main field of study? 
 
___ 
 
 
6. What is the name of the place (city or municipality) where you obtained your high 
school degree? 
 
___ 
 
 
7. What is your mother tongue? 
 
___ 
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Introductory questions I:  
 
 
8. A racket and a ball together cost 1.10 Euro. The racket costs 1 Euro more than the ball. 
How much costs the ball? 
 
___ Euro 
 
 
 
9. If 5 machines take 5 minutes to produce 5 parts, how long does 100 machines take to 
produce 100 parts? 
 
___ minutes 
 
 
 
10. A carpet of water lilies grows on a lake. Every day this carpet doubles in size. If it 
takes 48 days for the water lily carpet to cover the whole lake, how long would it take 
for this carpet to cover half the lake? 
 
___ days 
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Questions about behaviour I: 
 
For each of the following statements, indicate the likelihood that you would engage in such 
activity or conduct. Please use the following scale from 1 to 5: 
 
 
11.  ... camping in the wilderness far away from civilization and campsites? 
 
highly unlikely  1 2 3 4 5  very likely  
 
 
12. ...follow a tornado in a car to take dramatic pictures? 
 
highly unlikely  1 2 3 4 5  very likely  
 
 
13.  ...risking a day's income in a poker game?  
 
highly unlikely  1 2 3 4 5  very likely  
 
 
14.  ... invest 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock? 
 
highly unlikely  1 2 3 4 5  very likely  
 
 
15.  ...don't buckle your seatbelt in a car?  
 
highly unlikely  1 2 3 4 5  very likely  
 
 
16.  ...go home at night alone through an unsafe part of town?  
 
highly unlikely  1 2 3 4 5  very likely  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Faculty of Law and Economics 
- Department of Economics - 
Prof. Dr. Martin Peitz         
 
please turn the page... 
 
 
Introductory questions II:  
 
 
17. What's the name of the author of William Tell? 
 
 a) Johann Wolfgang von Goethe   b) Friedrich Schiller   
 
 c) Friedrich Hölderlin    (d) Theodor Fontane 
 
 
 
18. What year did Albert Einstein die? 
 
 a) 1955   b) 1947   c) 1961   d) 1938 
 
 
 
19. How many inhabitants does the Saarland (federal state) have? 
 
 a) 2,132,000  b) 1,670,000  c) 1,037,000  d) 890,000 
 
 
 
20. How big is the distance between earth and sun in "astronomical units"? 
 
 a) 587   b) 1    c) 4553   d) 14 
 
 
 
21. Which urban area has the largest population? 
 
 (a) Shanghai  (b) Istanbul   (c) Los Angeles  (d) Moscow 
 
 
 
22. How many of the last five questions do you think you answered correctly? 
 
 __ %    (0% to 100%) 
 
 
23. How many questions do you think the other participants answered correctly on 
average? 
 
 __ %    (0% to 100%) 
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Decision about lottery participation: 
 
You will now be presented with several lotteries, each of which you can either play or not 
play. The lotteries differ in the amount you can lose. By the end of this part, one lottery will 
be randomly selected and played in order to determine your payoff. You have a budget of 6 
euros. You can win or lose a maximum of 4 Euros, i.e. you will receive a payout of between 
10 and 2 Euros. 
 
Here is a brief example: 
 
Lottery Series Z: 
Gain 4,00 Euro  Probability of winning 50%. 
Loss see below  Probability of losing   50% 
 
Please make a cross each time you want to play the Z Series lottery! 
 
 
loss 
X 
-0,60 
Euro 
X 
-1,20 
Euro 
 
-1,80 
Euro 
 
-2,40 
Euro 
 
-3,00 
Euro 
 
-4,00 
Euro 
 
Î The player would play a Series Z lottery up to a loss of -1.20 euros.  
Î If the lottery with a loss of -0.60 Euro is randomly selected for being paid out, the 
player would win 4 Euro with 50% of chance, or lose 0.60 Euro with 50% of chance.  
Î A 50% probability, for example, corresponds to the probability of getting a 1, 2, or 3 
when rolling the dice. 
Î If the lottery with a loss of -1.80 Euros is randomly selected for being paid out, the 
player would not play and would not win or lose anything. 
 
If anything is still unclear to you, please contact the experimenter now.  
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Once you have understood the instructions, make the following lottery choices as described in 
the example above. After all the questionnaires have been collected, a lottery series and one 
lottery within this series will be randomly selected and then played. You will be paid the 
week after next week according to your choices and the realized payoffs in the lecture. 
 
Lottery Series A: 
Gain 4,00 Euro   Probability of winning 50% 
Loss see below  Probability of losing  50% 
 
Please make a cross each time you want to play the respective Series A lottery! 
 
 
loss 
 
-0,60 
Euro 
 
-1,20 
Euro 
 
-1,80 
Euro 
 
-2,40 
Euro 
 
-3,00 
Euro 
 
-4,00 
Euro 
Question 24-29. 
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Now choose between Lottery B and a safe payment. In Lottery B, you can win 4 Euros or 0 
Euros, but lose nothing. The probability is 50% in each case. 
 
Lottery B: 
Gain 4,00 Euro   Probability 50% 
Gain 0,00 Euro  Probability 50% 
 
Safe payment: 
Payment A (see right column in the table) 
 
Please choose between Lottery B and the Safe payment in each of the lines 1-6. Please 
make exactly one cross in each line! 
 
Table Lottery B Safe payment 
 
Line 1 
Lottery B 
 
A=0,40 Euro 
 
 
Line 2 
Lottery B 
 
A=0,80 Euro 
 
 
Line 3 
Lottery B 
 
A=1,20 Euro 
 
 
Line 4 
Lottery B 
 
A=1,60 Euro 
 
 
Line 5 
Lottery B 
 
A=2,00 Euro 
 
 
Line 6 
Lottery B 
 
A=2,40 Euro 
 
Question 30-35. 
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Questions about behaviour II: 
 
36. After every decision I've made, I wonder what would have happened if I'd made a 
different decision. 
 
not applicable at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 fully applicable 
 
 
 
37. When I make a decision, I try to find out afterwards what the other alternatives would 
have led to. 
 
not applicable at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 fully applicable 
 
 
 
38. Even a good decision is a failure if it turns out that another option would have been 
better. 
 
not applicable at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 fully applicable 
 
 
 
39. When I think about my life, missed opportunities often come to mind. 
 
not applicable at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 fully applicable 
 
 
 
40. Once I have decided, I do not question that decision. 
 
not applicable at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 fully applicable 
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Do you have any comments on this experiment? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________  
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________  
 
You have now completed the questionnaire for the experiment. Please wait until your sheet is 
picked up. Thank you for your patience! 
 
Please put your pen away and keep quiet. 
